b. Rejection of the Opinion

α. Against the first Proof

21. Against the first proof [n.19] in three ways:

First, because debt for eternal penalty does not stand along with charity; but along with charity stands not only venial sin not deleted after the act, but also the actually committed venial sin (this is plain according to everyone);     therefore etc     .

22. Proof of the minor [n.21], because through charity one is worthy of eternal life; if therefore along with this there stand a debt for eternal penalty, then one is at the same time worthy of eternal life and eternal penalty; but this is impossible, because no one can be debtor to eternal penalty for what he is ordained to glory in company with, because then glory and a penalty could stand together.

23. The major is also proved in another way, because after the act of mortal sin nothing remains of mortal sin save the debt of the penalty, as was said in d.14 q.1 nn.28-34. Therefore, if the debt of eternal penalty could stand along with grace, a mortal sin not remitted could, in the way in which it remains after the act, stand along with grace, and then the same person would be friend and enemy.

24. Again, second: the essential penalty of the damned is not the penalty of sense but the penalty of loss; but the penalty of loss is necessarily concomitant to any penalty, because no penalty can stand along with glory; therefore the debt for any eternal penalty includes the debt for the eternal penalty of loss, and consequently for the essential penalty of damnation; but damnation does not correspond to venial sin.

25. Again, third: venial and mortal sin are incommensurable in idea of malice or offense, for an infinity of venial sins, if they existed, would not equal one mortal sin in idea of offense, because neither would all of them turn one away from the end as a single mortal sin does. Therefore, the penalty that, according to justice, corresponds to mortal sin exceeds incommensurably and infinitely the penalty due to venial sin. But it does not incommensurably and infinitely exceed in intensity, because any infinite penalty exceeds or is exceeded finitely by another in intensity; therefore the excess will be in extension.Sc. the pains due as penalty to sin are not infinite in intensity (any actual pain will be determinate in how intense it is), so if the pains due to mortal sin exceed infinitely those due to venial sin, the infinity cannot be in intensity; so it must be in extension, that is, in the former lasting forever and the latter not. ⁶¹ Therefore eternal penalty is not due to venial sin.

26. And this conclusion I concede.

27. To the reasoning for the opposite [n.19] it is said in one way [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] that eternal penalty is due to venial sin per accidens (when it is conjoined with mortal sin), and not by reason of itself.

28. But this I do not understand, because God always punishes less than is deserving. And let it be that he would, according to rigor simply, punish up to what was fitting, it would be altogether unjust to inflict an eternal penalty for that for which in itself a temporal penalty is due. For however much it may be conjoined with another, this does not make it infinitely exceed the genus of its guilt; therefore, neither does a penalty exceeding to infinity justly correspond to it.

29. I say therefore that to venial sin, whether by punishing it here or in hell or elsewhere, is only due, whether in itself or per accidens, a temporal penalty, because it is in itself the sort of offense that in itself is sufficiently punished by temporal penalty.

30. Nor is it unacceptable for this penalty due to venial sin to have a limit in hell, because someone who is both truly penitent first, and fulfills part of the imposed penitence, and who, before he has fulfilled the whole of it, falls back into mortal sin, and dies in that mortal sin, will pay the penalty in hell for the remaining unfulfilled part of the penitence - but only a temporal penalty because, from the fact that, in the remission of prior sins, the debt of eternal penalty was changed into debt of temporal penalty, he is never in debt for those sins save for temporal penalty, and consequently when the total penalty is paid, he will be free of them.

31. Nor yet will there be redemption for him in hell, namely of the sin for which he is damned, because the debt of eternal penalty for that sin was never commuted into a debt of temporal penalty; and therefore the debt always remains, nor can that penalty ever be totally paid.

β. Against the Second Proof

32. About the second conclusion [n.20]:

It can be said that in one way it is so, because the remission of venial sin is nothing other than payment of the temporal penalty due for it.

33. The proof is that, after the act ceases, the guilt, which remains, is nothing but conviction for the due penalty; but being convicted for venial sin is nothing but being convicted for temporal penalty (from the preceding article [n.29]), and consequently, when the temporal penalty has been paid in purgatory for this venial sin, by this very fact is the venial guilt remitted.

34. But it is not so with mortal sin, because the penalty due for it cannot be totally paid unless the eternal penalty is first commuted into a temporal one; and this commutation is called remission of mortal guilt. But this remission only happens through an ordered voluntary displeasure of a sort that is not had after death.

Thus is one way plain as to how, after death, mortal sin cannot be remitted, but only the penalty due for mortal sin previously dismissed.

35. But venial sin previously committed and not dismissed can be dismissed after death, because the total penalty due for it can be paid, and thereby will it be remitted.

36. But this way is not satisfactory, because the saints seem to distinguish between remission of guilt of any sort and remission of penalty, and especially between remission of guilt and payment of the penalty due for the guilt.

37. It can be said in another way that venial sin in this life can be remitted, not only through interior or exterior penalty (because for this purpose that is not necessary), but through some act more accepted by God than the venial sin displease him - and this either referred by the doer himself to the remission of venial sin, or not referred by him but by God accepting it in its order thereto.

38. To the issue at hand: the works of this man who dies in charity, although after death they not be referred by him for the dismissing of the venial sin in which he died, and although too he not have any meritorious new act by which venial sin may be deleted, yet the works he did before can be referred by God to the remission of his venial sin after death.

39. And that in the following way: a cause that can be impeded does not, while it is impeded, realize its effect; however when it is not impeded it does realize it; but the merits of this man dying in charity would be sufficient cause for deletion of his venial sins, whether referred by himself or referred by God accepting the works in their order to this. Now his merits are, while he lives, impeded if he remains always actually in venial sin; after death, however, they are not impeded because then he is not continuing the act of venial sin; therefore his venial sins will be destroyed by them after this life.